In his dissertation, Wadge defined a notion of guessability on subsets of the Baire space and gave two characterizations of guessable sets. A set is guessable iff it is in the second ambiguous class (∆ ∆ ∆ 0 2 ), iff it is eventually annihilated by a certain remainder. We simplify this remainder and give a new proof of the latter equivalence. We then introduce a notion of guessing with an ordinal limit on how often one can change one's mind. We show that for every ordinal α, a guessable set is annihilated by α applications of the simplified remainder if and only if it is guessable with fewer than α mind changes. We use guessability with fewer than α mind changes to give a semi-characterization of the Hausdorff difference hierarchy, and indicate how Wadge's notion of guessability can be generalized to higher-order guessability, providing characterizations of ∆ ∆ ∆ 0 α for all successor ordinals α > 1.
Introduction
Let N N be the set of sequences s : N → N and let N <N be the set ∪ n N n of finite sequences. If s ∈ N <N , we will write [s] for { f ∈ N N : f extends s}. We equip N N with a second-countable topology by declaring [s] to be a basic open set whenever s ∈ N <N . Throughout the paper, S will denote a subset of N N . We say that S ∈ ∆ ∆ ∆ 0 2 if S is simultaneously a countable intersection of open sets and a countable union of closed sets in the above topology. In classic terminology, S ∈ ∆ ∆ ∆ 0 2 just in case S is both G δ and F σ .
The following notion was discovered by Wadge [9] (pp. 141-142) and independently by this author [1] . 1 Game theoretically, one envisions an asymmetric game where II (the guesser) has perfect information, I (the sequence chooser) has zero information, and II's winning set consists of all sequences (a 0 , b 0 , a 1 , b 1 , . . .) such that b i → 1 if (a 0 , a 1 , . . .) ∈ S and b i → 0 otherwise.
The following result was proved in [9] (pp.144-145) by infinite game-theoretical methods. The present author found a second proof [1] using mathematical logical methods. (Here • denotes topological closure.) Write Rm µ (S) for Rm µ (S, S c ).
By countability considerations, there is some (in fact countable) ordinal µ, depending on S, such that Rm µ (S) = Rm µ ′ (S) for all µ ′ ≥ µ; Wadge writes Rm Ω (S) for Rm µ (S) for such a µ. He then proves the following theorem: In Section 2, we introduce a simpler remainder (S, α) → S α and use it to give a new proof of Theorem 1.4.
In Section 3, we introduce the notion of S being guessable while changing one's mind fewer than α many times (α ∈ Ord) and show that this is equivalent to S α = / 0. In Section 4, we show that for α > 0, S is guessable while changing one's mind fewer than α + 1 many times if and only if at least one of S or S c is in the αth level of the difference hierarchy.
In Section 5, we generalize guessability, introducing the notion of µth-order guessability (1 ≤ µ < ω 1 ). We show that S is µth-order guessable if and only if S ∈ ∆ ∆ ∆ 0 µ+1 .
Guessable Sets and Remainders
In this section we give a new proof of Theorem 1.4. We find it easier to work with the following remainder 2 which is closely related to the remainder defined by Wadge. For X ⊆ N <N , we will write [X] to denote the set of infinite sequences all of whose finite initial segments lie in X.
Definition 2.1
Let S ⊆ N N . We define S α ⊆ N <N (α ∈ Ord) by transfinite recursion as follows. We define S 0 = N <N , and S λ = ∩ β <λ S β for every limit ordinal λ . Finally, for every ordinal β , we define
We write α(S) for the minimal ordinal α such that S α = S α+1 , and we write S ∞ for S α(S) .
Clearly S α ⊆ S β whenever β < α. This remainder notion is related to Wadge's as follows.
Lemma 2.2
For each ordinal α, Rm α (S) = [S α ].
Proof
Since S α ⊆ S β whenever β < α, for all α, we have S α = ∩ β <α S β +1 (with the convention that ∩ / 0 = N <N ). We will show by induction on α that
The reverse inclusion is similar. 
Proposition 2.3
If S is guessable then S ∞ = / 0.
Proof
Let G : N <N → {0, 1} be an S-guesser. Assume (for contradiction) S ∞ = / 0 and let σ 0 ∈ S ∞ . We will build a sequence on whose initial segments G diverges, contrary to Definition 1.1. Inductively suppose we have finite se-
By induction, there are
The ⇐ direction requires a little machinery.
Definition 2.4
If σ ∈ N <N , σ ∈ S ∞ , let β (σ ) be the least ordinal such that σ ∈ S β (σ ) .
Note that whenever σ ∈ S ∞ , β (σ ) is a successor ordinal.
Lemma 2.5
Suppose σ ⊆ τ are finite sequences. If τ ∈ S ∞ then σ ∈ S ∞ . And if σ ∈ S ∞ , then β (τ) ≤ β (σ ).
Proof
It is enough to show that ∀β ∈ Ord, if τ ∈ S β then σ ∈ S β . This is by induction on β , the limit and zero cases being trivial. Assume β is successor. If τ ∈ S β , this means τ ∈ S β −1 and there are τ ′ , τ ′′ ∈ [S β −1 ] extending τ with τ ′ ∈ S, τ ′′ ∈ S. Since τ ′ and τ ′′ extend τ, and τ extends σ , τ ′ and τ ′′ extend σ ; and since σ ∈ S β −1 (by induction), this shows σ ∈ S β .
Lemma 2.6
Suppose f :
Proof
The first part follows from Lemma 2.5 and the well-foundedness of Ord. For the second part we must show
Definition 2.7
If S ∞ = / 0 then we define G S : 
Proposition 2.8
If S ∞ = / 0 then G S guesses S. 
Guessing without changing one's Mind too often
In this section our goal is to tease out additional information about ∆ ∆ ∆ 0 2 from the operation defined in Definition 2.1.
, we say G changes its mind on f ↾ (n + 1). Now let α ∈ Ord. We say S is guessable with < α mind changes if there is an S-guesser G along with a function H : N <N → α such that the following hold, where f ∈ N N and n ∈ N.
(
This notion bears some resemblance to the notion of a set Z ⊆ N being f -c.e. in [4] , or g-c.a. in [7] . For α ∈ Ord, S is guessable with < α mind changes if and only if S α = / 0.
Proof
(⇒) Assume S is guessable with < α mind changes. Let G, H be as in Definition 3.1. We claim that for all β ∈ Ord, if σ ∈ S β then H(σ ) ≥ β . This will prove (⇒) because it implies that if S α = / 0 then there is some σ with H(σ ) ≥ α, absurd since codomain(H) = α.
We attack the claim by induction on β . The zero and limit cases are trivial. As-
And f ↾ (n + 1) does actually have some such infinite extension f ′′ , because if it had none, that would make G S ( f ↾ (n + 1)) = G S ( f ↾ n) by case 1 of the definition of G S (Definition 2.7). Being an extension of f ↾ (n + 1), f ′′ also extends f ↾ n; and by the assumption that
. By ( * ), f ′′ ∈ S c , and by ( * * ), f ′′ ∈ S. Absurd.
It is not hard to show S is a Boolean combination of open sets if and only if S is guessable with < ω mind changes, so Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 2.2 give a new proof of a special case of the main theorem (p. 1348) of [3] (see also [2] ).
Mind Changing and the Difference Hierarchy
We recall the following definition from [5] (p. 175, stated in greater generality-we specialize it to the Baire space). In this definition, Σ Σ Σ 
A η & the least η < θ with x ∈ A η has parity opposite to that of θ . (i) S is guessable with < α + 1 mind changes.
We will prove Theorem 4.2 by a sequence of smaller results.
Definition 4.3
For α, β ∈ Ord, write α ≡ β to indicate that α and β have the same parity (that is, 2|n − m, where α = λ + n and β = κ + m, n, m ∈ N, λ a limit ordinal or 0, κ a limit ordinal or 0).
then S is guessable with < α + 1 mind changes.
Proof
Define G : N <N → {0, 1} and H :
If there is an η < α (we may take η minimal) such that [σ ] ⊆ A η , then let
and G( f ↾ n) will always be 0, so lim n→∞ G( f ↾ n) = 0 = χ S ( f ). Assume f ∈ ∪ η<α A η , and let η < α be minimum such that f ∈ A η . Since A η is open, there is some n 0 so large that ∀n ≥ n 0 , [ f ↾ n] ⊆ A η . For all n ≥ n 0 , by minimality of η, [ f ↾ n] ⊆ A η ′ for any η ′ < η, so G( f ↾ n) = 0 if and only if η ≡ α. The following are equivalent.
Assume (for sake of contradiction)
By Claims 1-3, G and H witness that S is guessable with < α + 1 mind changes. 
Define H ′ (σ ) by induction on the length of σ as follows. Let
, whichever has parity opposite to H ′ (σ 0 ). By construction H ′ has the desired parity properties. A simple inductive argument shows that (
and we are done. Assume
which forces that ( * * ) H ′ ( f ↾ (n + 1)) = H( f ↾ (n + 1)) + 1. To see that
assume not ( * * * ). By Definition 3.1,
(By ( * )) Equality holds throughout, and
Definition 4.7
For all G, H as in Definition 3
Lemma 4.8
Suppose G : N <N → {0, 1} and H : N <N → α witness that S is guessable with < α mind changes. There is an H ′ : N <N → α such that G, H ′ witness that S is guessable with < α mind changes, and such that the following hold.
Proof
I claim that without loss of generality, we may assume the following ( * ):
To see this, suppose not: 
By Lemma 4.8 we may safely assume the following:
In other words,
, which will prove the proposition since each A η is clearly open. Suppose f ∈ S, I will show f ∈ D α ((A η ) η<α ). Since f ∈ S, H( f ) = α, because if H( f ) were = α, this would imply that G never changes its mind on f , forcing lim n→∞ G( f ↾ n) = lim n→∞ G( / 0) = 0, contradicting the fact that G guesses S. Since H( f ) = α, H( f ) < α. It follows that for η = H( f ) we have f ∈ A η and η is minimal with this property. Combining Corollaries 4.5 and 4.10 proves Theorem 4.2.
Higher-order Guessability
In this section we introduce a notion that generalizes guessability to provide a characterization for ∆ ∆ ∆ 0 µ+1 (1 ≤ µ < ω 1 ). We will show that S ∈ ∆ ∆ ∆ 0 µ+1 if and only if S is µth-order guessable. Throughout this section, µ denotes an ordinal in [1, ω 1 ).
Definition 5.1
Let S = (S 0 , S 1 , . . .) be a countably infinite tuple of subsets
(ii) We say that S is guessable based on S if there is a function
Game theoretically, we envision a game where I (the sequence chooser) has zero information and II (the guesser) has possibly better-than-perfect information: II is allowed to ask (once per turn) whether I's sequence lies in various S i . For each S i , player I's act (by answering the question) of committing to play a sequence in S i or in S c i is similar to the act (described in [6] , p. 366) of choosing a I-imposed subgame.
Example 5.2
If S enumerates the sets of the form { f ∈ N N : f (i) = j}, i, j ∈ N then it is not hard to show that S is guessable (in the sense of Definition 1.1) if and only if S is guessable based on S .
Definition 5.3
We say S is µth-order guessable if there is some S = (S 0 , S 1 , . . .) as in Definition 5.1 such that the following hold. In order to prove Theorem 5.4 we will assume the following result, which is a specialization and rephrasing of Exercise 22.17 of [5] (pp. 172-173, attributed to Kuratowski).
Lemma 5.5
The following are equivalent.
Proof of Theorem 5. 4 (⇒) Let S = (S 0 , S 1 , . . .) and G witness that S is µth-order guessable (so each S i ∈ ∆ ∆ ∆ 0 µ i +1 for some µ i < µ). For all a ∈ {0, 1} and X ⊆ N N , define
For notational convenience, we will write "G( a) = 1" as an abbreviation for  "0 ≤ a 0 , . . . , a m−1 ≤ 1 and G(a 0 , . . . , a m− 2. In general, there seems to be a correspondence between remainders on N N and remainders on N <N that take trees to trees; in the future we might publish more general work based on this observation.
